Revisiting the NAFTA Agenda on Climate Change by Jeffrey J. Schott & Meera Fickling
N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 9   j u l y   2 0 1 0
1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW     Washington, DC 20036     Tel 202.328.9000     Fax 202.659.3225     www.piie.com
Revisiting the NAFTA Agenda 
on Climate Change
Jeffrey J. Schott and Meera Fickling
Jeffrey J. Schott, senior fellow, joined the Peterson Institute for Inter-
national Economics in 1983. He is the author, coauthor, or editor of 
several books on trade, including Figuring Out the Doha Round (2010), 
Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd ed. (2007), Trade Relations 
Between Colombia and the United States (2006), NAFTA Revisited: 
Achievements  and  Challenges  (2005),  Free Trade  Agreements:  US 
Strategies and Priorities (2004), Prospects for Free Trade in the Amer-
icas (2001), Free Trade between Korea and the United States? (2001), 
and The WTO after Seattle (2000). Meera Fickling is a research analyst 
at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Note:  The  authors  would  like  to  thank Trevor  Houser  for  his  helpful 
comments on a previous draft of this paper.
© Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics. All rights reserved.
A year ago, we wrote a policy brief titled Setting the NAFTA 
Agenda on Climate Change, which explored issues of energy and 
environmental cooperation among the three North American 
countries in light of the climate legislation that had recently 
passed the US House of Representatives. Similar legislation did 
not pass the Senate, and Congressional leaders are now consid-
ering much more modest measures aimed at reducing green-
house gas (GHG) emissions and reforming US energy policy. 
This paper updates our analysis of what the NAFTA part-
ners could do together to promote renewable energy develop-
ment and capacity building on climate change. Some of our 
observations and suggestions have remained the same since our 
last policy brief, but many have been revised to take account of 
the changes in the US debate on climate policy.
Common north AmeriCAn interests
The three NAFTA partners have mutual interests in harmoniz-
ing climate policy. They share a common environment and a 
long history of environmental cooperation. The United States 
and Canada have signed acid rain and transboundary smog 
agreements,  and  the  United  States  and  Mexico  have  several 
border environmental and water compacts such as the Inter-
national Boundary and Water Commission. More recently, the 
North  American  Development  Bank  (NADB)  has  provided 
funding and coordination for environmental infrastructure in 
the US-Mexico border region. 
The NAFTA region also has an interdependent but not 
fully integrated energy market. How energy is produced, used, 
and traded has a large impact on GHG emissions and affects 
how each country can adapt to a low-carbon future. The United 
States is a major consumer of petroleum; Canada and Mexico 
are major US suppliers. Almost 30 percent of US oil imports 
come from North America, and in 2007 about 70 percent of 
the crude oil produced in Canada was shipped to the United 
States.1 Trade in energy totaled almost $100 billion between the 
United States and Canada and almost $10 billion between the 
United States and Mexico in 2007 (USITC 2009). Given their 
strong energy interdependence, US decisions that affect energy 
consumption will have a heavy impact on Canada and Mexico. 
Likewise, decisions made in Canada and Mexico that affect 
energy production will impact the US economy. 
While Canadian electricity does not make up a large portion 
of most US states’ electricity portfolios, it does account for a 
major percentage of total consumption in a few border states. 
Vermont obtains almost 40 percent of the electricity it consumes 
from Quebec, and North Dakota and Minnesota obtain more 
than 10 percent of the electricity they consume from Manitoba. 
US exports are less significant to Canadian provincial electricity 
supply; the exception is British Columbia, which gets almost   
10 percent of its electricity supply from American states.2 
1. Energy Information Administration. Statistics Canada. 2009.
2. Energy Information Administration, Statistics Canada, National Energy 
Board.
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In addition, the North American countries share a common 
interest  in  minimizing  policies  that  distort  North  American 
trade and investment. But the climate change debate has raised 
competitiveness concerns and prompted calls for border adjust-
ments to offset the impact of climate policies on domestic firms. 
Politicians and the public worry that pricing carbon could put 
US firms and workers at a competitive disadvantage against 
China and other Asian countries; in fact, however, Canada is 
the top supplier of US imports of most carbon-intensive goods.3 
Thus, there is much at stake for both countries in harmonizing 
policy in order to prevent trade-related border carbon measures. 
Finally, there is already several billion dollars’ worth of trade 
in environmental goods between the United States and Canada 
and between the United States and Mexico. Under a carbon-
constrained economy, all three countries stand to gain from 
expansion of this trade—both in North America and abroad.4
stArting from Behind
Climate change issues were not on the radar of the trade offi-
cials that negotiated the NAFTA in the early 1990s. During 
NAFTA’s early formative years, the issue was only briefly vetted 
in the North American Agreement on Environmental Coopera-
tion (NAAEC)’s Council on Environmental Cooperation while 
the three countries participated in the drafting of the Kyoto 
Protocol, which committed developed countries to begin to 
lower their aggregate emissions and to help developing coun-
tries  formulate  and  finance  GHG  mitigation  strategies.  The 
nascent NAAEC initiatives foundered amid strong opposition 
in the US Congress to the Kyoto Protocol.5 Neither the Clinton 
3. These include steel, cement, paper, and aluminum.  Canada is also the 
number two exporter of chemicals, behind Trinidad and Tobago.  See Rob 
Bradley et al. 2008. Leveling the Carbon Playing Field. Washington: Peterson 
Institute for International Economics and World Resources Institute. See also 
Gary Hufbauer et al. 2009. Global Warming and the World Trading System. 
Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics.
4. United Nations Conference on Trade And Development TRade Analysis 
and INformation System (UNCTAD-TRAINS) via World Integrated Trade 
Solution (WTI). 2009. Based on World Bank 2007 list of environmental 
goods (at 6-digit Harmonized System [HS] level).
5. Although the United States signed the Kyoto Protocol, the Byrd-Hagel 
nor the Bush administrations submitted the treaty for ratifica-
tion. Canada did ratify the Kyoto Protocol, but its subsequent 
actions on climate change have been very limited. 
Absent federal action, various US states and Canadian prov-
inces have pursued their own climate change policies. These have 
not been sufficient, however, to stem large emissions increases in 
all three NAFTA countries. In the United States, greenhouse gas 
emissions rose by 17 percent between 1990 and 2005. Canada’s 
performance was even worse, a 26 percent increase over 1990 
levels. Mexico’s emissions, though still low on a per-capita basis, 
increased by 37 percent during the same time period (see table 1). 
Fossil fuel–fired electricity generation is one of the main 
reasons why it has been difficult to control emissions. Between 
1990 and 2005, electricity emissions were responsible for the 
largest portion of the emissions increase in all three countries.6 
Coal  makes  up  almost  half  of  American  electricity;  about   
10 percent comes from renewables, including 6 percent from 
conventional hydropower (EIA 2010a). Like the United States, 
Mexico has a largely fossil fuel–based economy, with 9 percent 
of  generation  from  coal,  36  percent  from  natural  gas,  and   
29 percent from fuel oil. However, almost a quarter of Mexican 
electricity  comes  from  renewables,  including  21  percent 
from hydroelectric, and 3 percent comes from nuclear power 
(SENER 2007). Canada is the only country of the three that 
currently gets most of its electricity from hydropower, which 
provides almost 60 percent of Canada’s electricity. Nevertheless, 
Canadian electricity utility generation from fossil fuels jumped 
from 100 million MWh in 1995 to 150 million MWh in 2001, 
although the amount of fossil fuel–fired electricity has since 
fallen (Statistics Canada 2010). 
Resolution passed by the Senate in July 1997 by a vote of 95-0 clearly indi-
cated that the treaty as negotiated would fail in Congress.
6. Between 1990 and 2005, 63 percent of the emissions increase in the United 
States, 31 percent of the emissions increase in Canada, and 41 percent of the 
emissions increase in Mexico were attributed to electricity generation.  Source: 
World Resources Institute. Climate Analysis Indicators Tool. 2010; authors’ 
calculations.
“Almost 30 percent of US oil imports come 
from North America, and in 2007 about 
70 percent of the crude oil produced in 
Canada was shipped to the United States.”




US 5,975 6,964 17 percent
Canada 579 732 26 percent
Mexico 460 630 37 percent
World 30,055 37,767 26 percent
Source: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT), World Resources Institute, 2009, 
available at http://cait.wri.org (accessed on July 30, 2009). N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 9   j u l y   2 0 1 0
3
All  three  NAFTA  countries,  therefore,  have  much  lost 
ground to recover. The sharp recession in 2009 has significantly 
reduced  carbon  emissions,7  making  targets  set  according  to 
1990 or 2005 levels easier to meet. However, the wrenching 
economic adjustments have conversely made the task all the 
more  politically  difficult.  The  big  challenge  facing  political 
leaders is how to sell climate policies to consumers and industry, 
which fear sharp price increases for energy-intensive products, 
without  significantly  dampening  incentives  to  adapt  and 
conserve. Regional concentrations of carbon-intensive indus-
tries exacerbate the difficulty of this task. Studies showing that 
cap-and-trade legislation could create thousands of jobs and 
increase energy security have not prevented these fears from 
gradually watering down Senate climate goals in favor of weaker 
targets, utility-only legislation, or “energy-only” legislation as 
recently proposed by Senators Bingaman and Lugar (Houser, 
Mohan, and Hoffman 2010; Houser and Levi 2010).8 
Enter NAFTA. Since 2009, climate change issues have been 
given more priority on the NAFTA agenda. At the August 2009 
North American Leaders’ Summit (NALS) in Guadalajara heads 
of state agreed to legislate nationally and cooperate regionally. 
To that end, the three countries agreed to develop a Trilateral 
Working Plan on climate change and clean energy that would 
be considered at the NALS in 2010 (NALS 2009). The plan is 
supposed to foster inter alia the following notable actions:
n  financing mechanisms to support mitigation and adapta-
tion actions, including Mexico’s “Green Fund”;
n  comparable approaches to measuring, reporting, and veri-
fying emissions reductions, a prerequisite for any future 
North American emissions trading regime;
n  collaboration on “building a smart grid in North America” 
and cooperation on carbon capture and storage projects;
n  aligning national energy efficiency standards;
n  reducing GHG emissions in the oil and gas and transpor-
tation sectors (which account for a large share of GHG 
emissions in Mexico); and
n  cooperation  on  “protecting  and  enhancing  our  forests, 
wetlands, croplands, and other carbon sinks.”
Not surprisingly, the leaders finessed the key issue of how 
to reconcile interrelated and possibly conflicting demands to 
reduce GHGs and to ensure “reliable energy supplies across 
North America” (including from the Canadian oil sands). How-
7. Energy-related GHG emissions fell by 3 percent in 2008 and 7 percent in 
2009 (EIA 2010c). 
8. These bills are the American Clean Energy Leadership Act (ACELA), S. 
1462, and the Practical Energy and Climate Plan, S. 3464, respectively.
ever, the leaders’ declaration instructed officials to develop a 
work program on climate change for consideration at next year’s 
summit. Following NALS, the NAFTA Free Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) agreed in October 2009 to seek to strengthen the 
relationship between the FTC and the North American Com-
mission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) by appointing 
an ad hoc working group of senior trade officials to explore areas 
of potential collaboration (FTC 2009).
In addition, there have been US-Canada and US-Mexico 
bilateral talks on energy. In February 2009, the United States 
and Canada announced the commencement of a Clean Energy 
Dialogue toward the “development of clean energy technologies 
to reduce greenhouse gases and combat climate change.” The   
dialogue established three working groups on carbon capture 
and storage; creating an updated “smart” grid; and clean energy 
research  and  development.  A  2009  Bilateral  Framework  on 
Clean Energy and Climate Change between the United States 
and Mexico promised training and infrastructure to promote 
clean energy technologies (White House 2009). In May 2010, 
Presidents Obama and Calderón created a Cross-Border Elec-
tricity Task Force to promote regional renewable energy markets. 
Despite these efforts to cooperate regionally, national legis-
lation appears to have stalled, at least in the United States and 
Canada. Below, we detail the status of climate change action in 
the three NAFTA countries. 
CAnAdiAn PoliCy
Canadian  policy  faces  cross-cutting  environmental  and 
economic interests pitting climate change objectives against the 
exploitation of natural resources, especially oil sands. In both 
areas, Canadian officials are concerned that their policies may 
create frictions with their NAFTA partners that could affect 
regional  trade  and  investment.  The  Harper  administration 
wants to encourage development of Alberta’s oil sands resources, 
and has been concerned about California’s low-carbon fuel stan-
dard, which could potentially have a major impact on Alberta 
if widely adopted by other US jurisdictions. While pending US 
legislation initially included a (weak) national low-carbon fuel 
standard, the measure was subsequently dropped (Alberts 2009). 
Canada  exports  about  $68  billion  in  energy-intensive 
manufactures to the United States, and is thus highly concerned 
about  competitiveness  impacts  on  these  industries  should 
Canada fail to synchronize its policies with the United States. 
On the one hand, Canada is reluctant to subject these industries 
to higher costs than those experienced in the United States, so 
it prefers a continental approach to climate change rather than 
unilateral  action.  On  the  other  hand,  the  US  Congress  has 
threatened to require importers of carbon-intensive manufac-N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 9   j u l y   2 0 1 0
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tures from countries that fail to adopt equally stringent climate 
policies to buy allowances at the border. The Canadian National 
Round Table on Energy and the Environment recently warned 
that  Canada  could  face  ruinous  protectionism  if  it  did  not 
adopt a climate policy similar to that of its southern neighbor 
(NRTEE 2009). As a result, Canada has remained paralyzed on 
the issue, deferring action on climate change until the United 
States decides on its own policy course.
In the interim, Canada is slowly moving away from its 
previous climate change plan, Turning the Corner. In its January 
2010 Copenhagen submission, Canada pledged to reduce emis-
sions 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020—in contrast to 
Turning the Corner’s 20 percent by 2020 target—in line with 
the  United  States’  Copenhagen  promise  and  US  legislation 
currently on the table. Canada further qualified its submission 
as “to be aligned with the final economywide emissions target 
of the United States in enacted legislation.” Thus, the likelihood 
that Canada will act ahead of United States is slim. 
mexiCAn PoliCy
Mexico  has  set  ambitious  targets  for  GHG  mitigation.  In 
December  2008,  Mexico  promised  to  reduce  emissions   
50 percent below 2002 levels by 2050, and in an annex to the 
Copenhagen Accord, Mexico announced its commitment to 
reducing emissions 51 million metric tons (MMT) below busi-
ness as usual by 2012—equivalent to about a 6.4 percent cut—
and 30 percent below business as usual by 2020 (UNFCCC 
2010a).  Both  commitments  are  explicitly  contingent  upon 
developed-country financing. Mexico will also host the Confer-
ence of the Parties (COP) 16 in Cancún in late November-
December 2010. 
Unlike  Canada,  Mexico  has  not  predicated  its  actions 
upon those of the United States, and President Felipe Calderón 
has sharply criticized Canada for refusing to take a unilateral 
approach if necessary (Meyer 2010). In 2009, Mexico intro-
duced a Special Climate Change Program (PECC) that lays out 
actions toward meeting its 2012 target (ICCC 2009). Mexico 
likely will not develop an economywide cap-and-trade program 
in the near future, although the Ministry of Finance and the 
environment ministry have examined sector-specific cap-and-
trade  programs  for  PEMEX,  CFE,  and  CEMEX,  Mexico’s 
government-owned petroleum, electricity, and cement compa-
nies (Morales 2009). 
The Centro Mario Molina (2008) estimates that Mexico 
has the potential to reduce emissions 25 percent from 2005 
levels by 2030 using existing and near-commercial technolo-
gies. These reductions include an increase in the renewables 
share to 50 percent of generation by 2030,9 a shift in electricity 
generation from oil to natural gas, and installation of a smart 
grid system (Centro Mario Molina 2008). In order to reduce 
transport  emissions,  Mexico  will  also  need  to  embrace  new 
standards for fuel efficiency, develop sustainable biofuels, and 
expand public transport. Much of Mexico’s capital stock has not 
yet been built, so if investments are made in the near future, the 
cost of replacing existing infrastructure can be avoided.
The key to energy reform in Mexico is tax reform, however, 
and to date only modest and incremental progress has been made. 
Large energy subsidies reduce incentives to conserve and deplete 
government coffers at the same time. PEMEX and CFE both 
face serious budgetary problems that reduce the money avail-
able for new investments. Moreover, the government electricity 
monopoly operates under a set of restrictive conditions that effec-
tively impede the development of renewable energy resources.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto 
Protocol has had some success at financing emissions reduc-
tions in Mexico, delivering about 9 MMT of reductions every 
year (UNFCCC 2010a). These reductions, however, are small 
in comparison to Mexico’s short-term 51 MMT reduction goal 
and its medium-term goal to reduce emissions 30 percent below 
business as usual by 2020. In addition, the CDM is not well-
designed to fund projects in the transportation sector, where 
it is difficult to monitor nonstationary pollution sources and 
determine additionality (Labriet, Caldés, and Izquierdo 2009). 
Out of 2,262 CDM projects currently registered by developing 
countries, only three are transport related.10 Furthermore, the 
majority  of  emissions  reduction  potential  in  forestry  lies  in 
activities such as forest management whose additionality is diffi-
cult to ascertain and which fall outside the scope of the CDM 
(Tudela 2003). 
Although $100 billion was promised for developing coun-
tries in Copenhagen, it is unclear where the money will come 
from or how it will be disbursed. Funds may be given in greater 
measure  to  least-developed  countries,  rather  than  middle-
9. The researchers estimate a modest increase in solar, geothermal, and 
hydroelectric power relative to Mexico’s potential.  However, they assume that 
Mexico makes better use of “stranded” wind generation sites in order to exceed 
its current calculated wind potential. 
10. One hundred twenty-one CDM projects are registered in Mexico (UN-
FCCC CDM 2010). 
“The key to energy reform in Mexico is tax 
reform, however, and to date only modest 
and incremental progress has been made.”N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 9   j u l y   2 0 1 0
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income  countries  like  Mexico  (Houser  2010).  In  February 
2010, the United Nations set up an Advisory Group on Climate 
Change Financing that will study potential sources of revenue 
for this fund, including both public and private sources (United 
Nations 2010). Given the slow pace of progress of UN efforts in 
this area, Mexico would benefit from additional bilateral tech-
nical and financial assistance from its NAFTA partners, as well 
as the development of an integrated North American climate 
regime that would ensure that environmentally sound Mexican 
projects qualify to sell carbon credits to the other two countries. 
Us PoliCy
To date, US climate policy has largely been pursued by indi-
vidual  states,  many  following  precedents  of  performance 
standards set by California. Thirty states adopted a renewable 
portfolio standard, and 17 states committed to adopting auto-
mobile emissions standards that would produce fuel economy 
improvements in excess of federal regulation. Many states also 
implemented energy efficiency measures. 
These policies were developed in the face of federal inac-
tion on climate change. During the negotiation of the Kyoto 
Protocol, the US Congress had indicated its unwillingness to 
ratify  a  treaty  to  reduce  greenhouse  gases  unless  developing 
countries  such  as  China  and  India  made  similar  commit-
ments.  Subsequently,  the  Bush  administration  rejected  the 
Kyoto Protocol, followed a permissive environmental agenda 
regarding regulation of CO2 as a pollutant, and blocked states 
from implementing stricter automobile standards. Overall US 
GHG emissions increased despite increased energy efficiency. 
With  the  entrance  of  the  Obama  administration,  this 
dynamic  appeared  to  have  changed.  The  administration  has 
directed the National Highway Transportation Safety Authority 
to raise fuel economy standards to California levels, and issued 
an endangerment finding for CO2. Most importantly, a cap-
and-trade bill, the American Clean Energy and Security Act 
(ACES), passed the House of Representatives, and a similar 
bill, the American Power Act, was introduced in the Senate. 
However, the American Power Act remains in legislative limbo. 
A pending Senate bill, the American Clean Energy Leader-
ship Act (ACELA) by Democratic Senator Jeff Bingaman, could 
instead define US climate and energy policy going forward, 
along with various state regulations. The Practical Energy and 
Climate Plan introduced by Republican Senator Dick Lugar 
could influence the final outcome as well, although it has not 
passed committee and does not have the same support of the 
Democratic leadership. Neither bill has a comprehensive plan 
to reduce GHG emissions, instead including a patchwork of 
measures  designed  to  encourage  clean  energy  development. 
While both include low-carbon portfolio standards for electric 
utilities that address emissions from electricity production—
which were responsible for 63 percent of the emissions increase 
in the United States between 1990 and 2005—both standards 
are weaker than the renewable electricity standard in ACES in 
the near term.11 
federAl legislAtion Pending in the  
United stAtes
Cap-and-Trade
Both ACES and the American Power Act contain a cap-and-
trade  program  that  regulates  GHG  emissions  from  covered 
sources such that they achieve a 3 percent reduction from 2005 
levels by 2012, a 17 percent reduction by 2020, a 42 percent 
reduction  by  2030,  and  an  83  percent  reduction  by  2050. 
About 85 percent of total emissions are covered under the cap 
and trade programs. Both bills allow for a total of two billion 
tons of firms’ compliance obligations to be met with offsets. 
ACES allows up to half of these offsets to come from interna-
tional sources, and the American Power Act allows for up to a 
quarter of offsets to be internationally derived. 
Renewable Portfolio Standards
ACES  requires  6  percent  of  suppliers’  electricity  load  to  be 
derived from eligible sources and/or energy efficiency in 2012. 
This requirement escalates to 20 percent in 2020. Up to one 
quarter of firms’ compliance obligations can be met through 
energy efficiency as opposed to renewable electricity, unless the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission upon petition increases 
the standard to two-fifths. Eligible renewable sources include 
wind, biomass, solar, geothermal, some hydropower, marine, 
and hydrokinetic energy. Other eligible energy sources include 
landfill gas, wastewater treatment gas, coal mine methane, and 
qualified waste-to-energy. In addition, the standard is reduced 
in proportion to the portion of a supplier’s electricity sales that 
are generated from existing hydroelectric facilities, new nuclear 
facilities, and fossil fuel units that use carbon capture and storage. 
Similar provisions are included in the Bingaman and Lugar 
bills, although both Senate versions are weaker. Bingaman’s bill 
requires electricity utilities to obtain 15 percent of electricity 
sales from renewable sources or energy efficiency savings by 
2021. This requirement is predicted to be roughly along busi-
11. In fact, the Bingaman renewable portfolio standard does not exceed 
business-as-usual predictions by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
(Union of Concerned Scientists 2009). N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 9   j u l y   2 0 1 0
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ness-as-usual lines (United Nations 2010). Lugar’s bill requires 
utilities to obtain 20 percent of electricity from “diverse sources” 
by 2020, which may include any combination of renewable 
electricity, energy efficiency, nuclear power, or coal sources that 
sequester more than 80 percent of emissions. Both bills also 
include a building standard that requires buildings to achieve 
30 percent in energy savings relative to 2006 levels in 2010 and 
50 percent savings in 2016.
Other Provisions
All of the legislation discussed above—ACES, the American 
Power Act, and the Bingaman and Lugar energy bills—includes 
provisions to increase building efficiency by 50 percent within 
the next decade.12 In addition, the Lugar bill contains a provi-
sion that exempts old coal plants from environmental regula-
tions as long as they shut down by 2018. The bill also requires 
national fuel economy standards to automatically increase by   
4 percent per year. The Bingaman bill directs the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) to remove barriers to distrib-
uted generation by creating a harmonized national interconnec-
tion standard and to revamp the transmission grid. 
stAte And ProvinCiAl legislAtion
Due to the uncertainty surrounding US and Canadian federal 
legislation at this time, states and provinces may gain increased 
importance as the leaders of climate policy in both countries. 
If lawmakers are able to put into action all of the state initia-
tives currently on the table, coverage of these programs will 
be extended to the greater part of the United States, including 
the industry-heavy Midwest. States are developing and imple-
menting several programs that may not be passed at the national 
level in the near term, including caps on industry and transpor-
tation emissions, renewable portfolio standards, and low-carbon 
fuel standards. Below, we explain some of these policies in detail.
Cap and Trade
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is the only 
multi-state  cap-and-trade  system  with  mandatory  emissions 
caps currently in force in the United States. Members include 
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
12. The building sector contains some of the most cost-effective emissions 
abatement opportunities. See Houser, Trevor. 2009. The Economics of Energy 
Efficiency in Buildings. Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy 
Brief 09-17. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics. 
The program initially covers only electric power generators—
about 95 percent of the electricity sector falls under the cap-
and-trade  regime—but  coverage  may  expand  later  to  other 
sectors such as transportation. The goal of the cap-and-trade 
system is to stabilize emissions from 2009 to 2014 and reduce 
emissions by 2.5 percent per year between 2015 and 2018, for a 
total decline in emissions of 10 percent by 2018 (RGGI 2008). 
The Western  Climate  Initiative  (WCI)  is  an  agreement 
among  California,  Montana,  New  Mexico,  Oregon,  Wash-
ington, British Columbia, Manitoba, Quebec, and Ontario to 
reduce emissions 15 percent below 2005 levels by 2020. Unlike 
the RGGI, the WCI envisions an economywide cap by 2015. 
California has led US states on implementation, publishing a 
draft regulation under Assembly Bill 32 in 2009. 
However, other US states including Oregon, Washington, 
and Montana seem unlikely to be able to implement a cap-and-
trade program by the WCI start deadline. The New Mexico 
environmental department, faced with opposition in the state 
legislature, is attempting to formulate resolutions under existing 
state law. Even California’s law is subject to a ballot measure 
in November 2010 that could suspend it until unemployment 
reaches 5.5 percent—which is not likely to happen in the near 
future. Republican gubernatorial candidate Meg Whitman also 
supports postponing implementation until 2013.
Despite these possible setbacks, the WCI is likely to have 
a  far  larger  geographic  scope  than  the  RGGI.  Whereas  the 
RGGI trading program is confined to the northeastern part of 
the United States, with Canadian observers, the WCI trading 
system involves both US states and Canadian provinces, with 
Mexican observers. Further, the WCI allows carbon offsets to 
come from anywhere in North America, whereas RGGI offsets 
must come from within the RGGI region. 
Renewable Portfolio Standards
The  most  common  local  measure  implemented  in  North 
America, the renewable portfolio standard, is a requirement 
that covered utilities supply a certain percentage of electricity 
from renewable sources. As of 2007, 31 percent of US retail 
electricity sales were covered by a mandatory renewable stan-
“To date, US climate policy has largely 
been pursued by individual states, many 
following precedents of performance 
standards set by California.”N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 9   j u l y   2 0 1 0
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dard (Wiser and Barbose 2008). Although the renewable energy 
requirement is the most common measure catalogued in our 
study, measures differ widely across the continent. The most 
obvious area of divergence is the target percentage of renew-
able energy to be achieved by a certain date; arguably the least 
stringent target belongs to Texas—5 percent by 2015—whereas 
California’s target is 33 percent by 2020. 
Other areas of divergence, however, are more significant for 
North American cooperation. In particular, rules regarding eligi-
bility of various sources of electricity, recognition of other states’ 
renewable electricity, and recognition of other states’ renewable 
electricity  credits  (RECs)  vary  widely  across  the  continent. 
Varying definitions of renewable energy limit the fungibility of 
REC markets, as a REC certified in one state might not be able to 
be sold to another state in order to comply with the second state’s 
standard.  Despite  definitions  of  renewable  energy  that  differ 
from state to state, many state laws do not clarify which RECs 
can be used to count toward RPS compliance and which cannot 
(Holt and Wiser 2007). In addition, the systems that certify and 
manage renewable electricity credits are highly regionalized.
imPliCAtions of ClimAte legislAtion for north 
AmeriCAn trAde And CooPerAtion
Carbon Market Integration
Both the House and Senate cap-and-trade bills contain interna-
tional allowance trading provisions whose use could help link 
climate policies in North America. In order for US firms to use 
allowances “imported” from a foreign country, however, the 
foreign country must have a national or international carbon 
trading regime that imposes mandatory greenhouse gas emis-
sions limits on one or more sectors. The foreign cap-and-trade 
program needs to be at least as stringent as that of the United 
States. For Canada, which is likely to meet this standard, allow-
ance trading with the United States could be a boon, lowering 
the  price  of  allowances  and  greatly  mitigating  pressures  on 
carbon-intensive industries (Bramley, Partington, and Sawyer 
2009). If Mexico implements a sectoral cap-and-trade program 
that produces reductions comparable to those in the Waxman-
Markey bill, it could, under the bill, take part in a trilateral 
cap-and-trade program for those sectors. 
If cap-and-trade programs are limited to US states, as is 
likely to be the case, there could still be an opportunity to trade 
emissions allowances trilaterally. In fact, the state and provin-
cial cap-and-trade programs are by nature trilateral. The RGGI 
contains  Canadian  observers  that  could  potentially  join  the 
program later on. Four Canadian provinces are scheduled to 
participate in the WCI and all of the Mexican border states—
Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, 
and Tamaulipas—are observers. 
The WCI is open to participation from any North Amer-
ican jurisdiction, in one of several capacities. Any jurisdiction 
may join the initiative so long as it adopts the same emissions 
reduction commitments—15 percent by 2020. The WCI also 
permits allowances from other cap-and-trade programs to be 
sold within the region, although the combined total of outside 
allowances and offsets is restricted to no more than 49 percent 
of emissions reductions (WCI 2009). The standards for sale 
of outside emissions allowances to the WCI are as yet unclear. 
There is also the potential to link with the WCI through offset 
sales, as detailed below. 
International Offset Provisions
The significant portion of international offsets allowed under 
pending cap-and-trade legislation could provide a channel for 
US support for GHG mitigation in Mexico. Used properly, 
offset markets can improve the environment, reduce defores-
tation, alleviate poverty, and lower the cost of abating climate 
change. Although the offsets would not provide reductions in 
addition to those realized by developed-country cap-and-trade 
programs—one would not wish to double-count offset reduc-
tions toward both the United States and Mexican emissions 
reduction programs, for example—they could provide funding 
to start Mexico on a path to a lower-carbon economy. Centro 
Mario Molina (2008) estimates that Mexican offsets could be 
worth US$2 billion per year by 2030, assuming a US$50 per 
ton carbon price. 
As stated above, up to one billion tons of emissions could 
potentially be offset internationally under ACES, and up to   
500 million tons may potentially be offset internationally under 
the American Power Act.13 Due to its relatively high GHG 
emissions level and relatively high GDP, Mexico would likely 
be required to sell offset credits on a sectoral basis in sectors 
covered under the federal cap-and-trade program. This means 
that for sectors covered under cap-and-trade, only emissions 
reductions under a countrywide baseline could be sold. Base-
lines  would  need  to  be  established  below  business-as-usual 
trajectories. Reduced emissions from degradation and defores-
tation (REDD) credits could also only be issued to Mexico for 
emissions reductions under a countrywide baseline; these base-
lines would be established according to nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions (NAMAs) and would need to achieve net 
zero deforestation in 20 years. 
13. These numbers are subject to firm-specific offset limits detailed in both 
bills.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 9   j u l y   2 0 1 0
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Neither the Bingaman nor the Lugar bill includes a role for 
offsets, as neither includes a cap-and-trade program for carbon 
emissions.  Even  without  a  federal  cap-and-trade  program, 
however, there is still a significant opportunity for Mexico to 
sell offsets in North America. Although the RGGI limits offsets 
to those produced within the RGGI region, WCI offsets may 
come from anywhere within North America and may account 
for up to 49 percent of emissions reductions. The WCI design 
recommendations require WCI partners to set stringent stan-
dards for monitoring, reporting, and verifying offsets. 
Renewable Electricity Trade
Both Mexico and Canada have abundant renewable resources 
that could be sold to the United States to meet renewable elec-
tricity procurement goals. Canada derives about 60 percent of 
its electricity from hydropower, and Mexico’s La Venta and La 
Rumorosa regions contain some of the best wind capacity in the 
world. Although Mexico’s expected 2012 renewable electricity 
capacity of 5 GW is only a tiny fraction of total US electricity 
needs, it could play a more significant role in the generation 
portfolios of some US border states (Dukert 2010). In partic-
ular, demand for renewable energy in California will be high, as 
it is currently required to procure a third of its electricity from 
renewable sources by 2020. 
Mexico’s  fledgling  renewable  electricity  industry  in 
particular has the biggest stake in ensuring open markets for 
renewable energy. Because Mexico’s state-run energy monopoly, 
the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE), faces high barriers 
to purchasing renewable electricity for public use, private elec-
tricity  purchases  have  driven  Mexican  renewable  electricity 
development (Wood 2010). US states could present Mexico 
with yet another outlet for development of its rich renewable 
resources along the border. Many US states allow for electricity 
generated outside their jurisdiction to count toward meeting 
renewable targets, so long as the electricity is delivered to a 
utility within their jurisdiction. 
Already, the United States and Mexico have taken steps 
toward cooperation on these issues. As part of a 2009 Bilateral 
Framework on Clean Energy and Climate Change, Presidents 
Obama and Calderón committed to address transmission and 
distribution obstacles between the two countries (White House 
2009). In May 2010, the two presidents launched a Cross-
Border Electricity Task Force to promote a regional renewable 
energy market and advance options on standards, electricity 
transmission, and grid connections (White House 2010). These 
initiatives should be used toward substantive action to address 
barriers  to  renewable  energy  trade  and  development  in  the 
border region.
However, lack of transmission capacity prevents Mexico 
from fully taking advantage of US renewable electricity markets 
(Wood 2010). Currently, the Baja California-California con-
nection  comprises  the  only  significant  transmission  capacity 
between Mexico and the United States, but it has only one 
800-MW transmission line operated by CFE and San Diego 
Gas and Electricity, and two privately owned lines of 310 MW 
and 1,200 MW, for a total of 2.3 GW of transmission capac-
ity (PA Government Services 2009, Wood 2010). The rest of 
Mexico is cut off from this transmission. 
In addition to direct transmission, many states allow utili-
ties to buy tradable RECs for renewable electricity generated 
outside the state, even if the electricity itself is not actually 
delivered to the state. New Mexican utilities may count RECs 
toward compliance with its renewable electricity standard, and 
California is considering regulations that would allow its utili-
ties to do the same. 
Currently, the only Mexican state that may sell RECs to 
either state is Baja California, as it is the only state permitted to 
register credits with the Western Renewable Energy Generation 
Information System (WREGIS) tracking system. Both states 
require eligible RECs to be certified by WREGIS. 
In  theory,  hydropower  transmitted  from  Canada  could 
also help US border states meet renewable portfolio standard 
requirements. In order for hydropower to qualify as renewable 
electricity under any of the various federal bills under consid-
eration, however, it must meet standards for additionality and 
environmental  quality.  In  verifying  compliance  with  these 
standards, inclusion of Canadian hydropower as a qualifying 
renewable source poses regulatory difficulties. The US Federal 
Electricity Regulatory Commission is responsible for certifying 
qualified hydropower in all federal bills, but FERC does not 
have jurisdiction over Canada. In order for Canadian hydro-
power to qualify under federal renewable electricity legislation, 
Canada  would  have  to  negotiate  some  form  of  equivalency 
agreement for certification of compliance with US standards. 
Even  unqualified  hydropower  can  help  a  utility  meet 
its  renewable  portfolio  obligation  under  federal  standards. 
Unqualified  hydropower,  along  with  nuclear  electricity  and 
“Both federal cap-and-trade bills on 
the table, ACES and the American Power 
Act, contain two types of provisions to 
protect the competitiveness of trade-
exposed manufacturing sectors.”N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 9   j u l y   2 0 1 0
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electricity generated using carbon capture and sequestration, is 
subtracted from a utility’s base generation amount. Thus, the 
more hydropower a utility uses, the less energy that utility is 
obligated to produce from renewable power.
Many  states  exclude  large  hydropower  altogether  from 
qualifying as renewable electricity, a point that is highly conten-
tious among US and Canadian border states. Hydro Quebec 
has been a vocal advocate for including large-scale hydropower 
in state standards, arguing in New York State discussions and 
preparing a submission to the NAFTA CEC. Manitoba Hydro 
and the state of Minnesota have also clashed over the definition 
of hydropower in state standards (Rowlands 2009). 
Industrial Competitiveness
Both  federal  cap-and-trade  bills  on  the  table,  ACES  and 
the American Power Act, contain two types of provisions to 
protect the competitiveness of trade-exposed manufacturing 
sectors.  First,  a  rebate  program  compensates  trade-exposed 
manufacturing  industries  for  100  percent  of  sector  average 
costs.  Second,  an  international  allowance  reserve  program 
could require importers of goods from countries that (1) have 
not adopted commitments comparable to those of the United 
States; (2) have not negotiated a sectoral emissions reduction 
agreement with the United States; and (3) have a sector-average 
carbon intensity of production greater than that of the United 
States to buy allowances at the border to compensate for the 
difference in regulation. Because these conditions do not take 
into account common but differentiated responsibilities, coun-
tries such as Mexico that are not likely to make international 
commitments as stringent as those of the United States could 
be sideswiped by this provision should cap-and-trade legisla-
tion take effect. 
The  international  reserve  allowance  provision  is  put  off  
until 2020 in ACES and 2025 or later in the American Power 
Act, giving countries time to either (1) negotiate a binding 
international  agreement  in  which  all  major  emitters  reduce 
greenhouse gases “equitably,” which would stave off the border 
allowance program entirely; or (2) negotiate bilateral sectoral 
agreements  with  the  United  States  in  order  to  keep  trade 
flowing in those sectors. However, several members of Congress 
already have indicated that they would seek a more immediate 
application of border adjustment measures, if a cap-and-trade 
bill goes forward in the Congress. 
oPPortUnities for north AmeriCAn 
CooPerAtion
As in our previous policy brief, we conclude with concrete steps 
that the three North American countries could pursue together 
to advance their national climate change objectives. Some of 
our recommendations have remained the same; some have been 
changed slightly; and some have been added. Combined, they 
form a pragmatic NAFTA agenda for action on climate change 
issues under an uncertain regulatory regime.
1.  Use the Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
(CEC)  as  a  clearinghouse  for  climate  change–related 
data. The CEC is underutilized and underfunded; with 
modest budgetary increments it could play a significant 
role in NAFTA climate change initiatives by expanding 
its database on North American emissions and reporting 
on new climate initiatives and regulations in each country. 
In so doing, the CEC could become a North American 
clearinghouse for monitoring, reporting, and verification 
(MRV) of carbon credits—issued under national or re-
gional carbon regimes—that could lower transaction costs 
of offset projects among the three countries. 
2.  Study options for coordinating or integrating evolving 
carbon  regimes,  both  at  the  federal  and  state  levels. 
Policy coordination could facilitate carbon credit trading 
by ensuring that carbon credits in all three countries repre-
sent similar kinds of carbon reductions. On the national 
level, such coordination could evolve from two separate but 
similar national cap-and-trade systems in the United States 
and  Canada,  with  incentives  for  Mexican  participation. 
On the state level, various state and regional cap-and-trade 
programs might create a framework for mutual recognition 
of each other’s carbon credits. 
3.  Standardize definitions of renewable energy and coor-
dinate policies. Currently, definitions vary widely among 
states and provinces, complicating regulation of renewable 
electricity from across the border. The major differences 
between the US and Canadian regulations lie in the eligi-
bility of hydropower to meet renewable standards. Both 
sides should make virtue out of necessity and agree on 
how imported electricity should be credited and certified 
under renewable portfolio standards, both at the federal 
and state levels. To the extent feasible, states and provinces 
should harmonize definitions of renewable electricity in 
order to stimulate development by increasing the fungi-
bility of RECs. N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 9   j u l y   2 0 1 0
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4.  Harmonize renewable electricity tracking systems. REC 
tracking systems are highly regionalized, which limits the 
jurisdictions that are able to sell RECs to certain states. 
Harmonization and expansion of renewable energy credit 
tracking systems could widen the geographic area from 
which renewable credits could be purchased. 
5.  Improve  cross-border  transmission  capacity  between 
the United States and Mexico. Additional cross-border 
transmission would allow for firms conducting renewables 
projects to take advantage of economies of scale, and in 
fact  several  firms  have  already  located  generation  sites 
along both sides of the border in the hopes of scaling up 
generation for both markets (Wood 2010). Such econo-
mies of scale would lower the cost of compliance with state 
renewable  standards,  make  solar  and  wind  power  more 
competitive relative to conventional fuels, and accelerate 
the development of renewable infrastructure on both sides 
of the border.
6.  Use  NAFTA  institutions  for  capacity  building  in 
Mexico.  First,  NAFTA  facilitation  of  Mexican  carbon 
offset sales could potentially generate revenue that could 
be put toward climate change measures in Mexico. Second, 
the North American Development Bank (NADB) should 
be  used  to  provide  finance  and  technical  assistance  for 
energy-saving and pollution-control projects in Mexico in 
support of its ambitious climate change policies. 
7.  Establish a “safe harbor” to shield climate change taxes 
and regulations from claims under the indirect takings 
provisions of NAFTA chapter 11. Chapter 11 requires 
governments  to  provide  compensation  to  investors  for 
measures that are “tantamount to expropriation.” To date, 
chapter 11 decisions have not cast a wide web regarding 
findings  of  indirect  expropriation  resulting  from  the 
implementation  of  environmental  laws  and  regulations. 
Climate change laws will most likely have much broader 
economic effects than prior environmental legislation, and 
the scope of potential claims under NAFTA chapter 11 due 
to climate change laws and regulations could be orders of 
magnitude greater than those filed in the past. The poten-
tial for such chapter 11 litigation against climate change 
laws could slow the implementation of measures designed 
to mitigate GHG emissions as well as adversely affecting 
flows of trade and investment in the region. 
8.  Adopt a NAFTA peace clause. In the near term, trade mea-
sures or border adjustments should not be used to equalize 
costs  between  domestic  and  foreign  producers,  as  these 
measures are likely to be emulated or provoke retaliation 
in other countries. In order to handle competitiveness con-
cerns that are not addressed through international climate 
negotiations, a framework needs to be developed under the 
WTO so as not to give rise to litigation or to snowballing 
protectionism. Because such a framework would take a few 
years to develop, a temporary “peace clause” suspending 
border measures for a limited time should be incorporated 
into US (and foreign) climate legislation in order to en-
courage international negotiating efforts. This is particu-
larly necessary in light of current regulatory uncertainty in 
all three NAFTA countries.
In addition to these recommendations, the North Amer-
ican countries might consider harmonization of emissions stan-
dards or the establishment of a North American carbon trading 
regime. North American cooperation could serve as a model for 
how developed and developing countries can mutually benefit 
from an international climate change agreement.
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